refactor(tools): remove artificial analysis ceilings

src/browser/JavaScriptRuntimeScope.ts

@@ -3,39 +3,28 @@ import {
   sanitizeBrowserUrl,
 } from "../domain/browserObservation.js";
 import type { JavaScriptRuntimeLocation } from "../domain/javascriptRuntimeObservation.js";
-import {
-  authorizedElectronFile,
-  canonicalElectronRoots,
-} from "./ElectronFileScope.js";
+import { authorizedElectronFile } from "./ElectronFileScope.js";
 
 export type RuntimeLocationDecision =
   | { readonly allowed: true; readonly location: JavaScriptRuntimeLocation }
   | {
       readonly allowed: false;
-      readonly reason:
-        | "outside_file_roots"
-        | "outside_origins"
-        | "unsupported_location";
+      readonly reason: "unsupported_location";
     };
 
-/** Canonicalize exact filesystem scopes before Inspector attachment. */
-export const canonicalRuntimeRoots = canonicalElectronRoots;
-
-/** Authorize one protocol URL without retaining an out-of-scope value. */
+/** Resolve a protocol location exposed by the explicitly selected Inspector endpoint. */
 export const authorizeRuntimeLocation = async (
   value: string,
-  roots: readonly string[],
-  origins: readonly string[],
 ): Promise<RuntimeLocationDecision> => {
-  if (value.startsWith("node:") && value.length <= 4_096)
+  if (value.startsWith("node:") && value.length > 0)
     return {
       allowed: true,
       location: { kind: "builtin", specifier: value },
     };
   if (value.startsWith("file:")) {
-    const filePath = await authorizedElectronFile(value, roots);
+    const filePath = await authorizedElectronFile(value);
     return filePath === undefined
-      ? { allowed: false, reason: "outside_file_roots" }
+      ? { allowed: false, reason: "unsupported_location" }
       : { allowed: true, location: { kind: "file", file_path: filePath } };
   }
   let url: URL;
@@ -47,8 +36,8 @@ export const authorizeRuntimeLocation = async (
   if (!["http:", "https:"].includes(url.protocol))
     return { allowed: false, reason: "unsupported_location" };
   const parsedOrigin = browserOriginSchema.safeParse(url.origin);
-  if (!parsedOrigin.success || !origins.includes(parsedOrigin.data))
-    return { allowed: false, reason: "outside_origins" };
+  if (!parsedOrigin.success)
+    return { allowed: false, reason: "unsupported_location" };
   return {
     allowed: true,
     location: {
@@ -62,10 +51,4 @@ export const authorizeRuntimeLocation = async (
 /** Authorize a target whose Node Inspector URL omits its main entry path. */
 export const authorizeRuntimeTargetLocation = async (
   value: string,
-  targetType: string,
-  roots: readonly string[],
-  origins: readonly string[],
-): Promise<RuntimeLocationDecision> =>
-  // A bare file:// URL contains no source identity. Do not attach to the
-  // first configured root merely because the target happens to be Node.
-  authorizeRuntimeLocation(value, roots, origins);
+): Promise<RuntimeLocationDecision> => authorizeRuntimeLocation(value);