* fix(hopper): report unavailable procedure body coverage
* refactor!: simplify runtime tools and remove replay engines
Keep direct inspection, capture, and comparison tools. Bind handlers to named contracts and let agents compose experiments with commands and local fixture servers.
BREAKING CHANGE: Remove controlled replay, Node characterization, finite replay-machine, managed runtime planning, and redundant string-tracing tools. Retire process replay, shims, reactive scenarios, custom checkpoints, and active browser replay and origin-scope inputs.
* fix(platform): accept absolute paths for any host and stop blaming the ceiling for a missing grant
Addresses #548 and #545.
#548: processScenarioSchema required a leading "/" for executable,
working_directory and filesystem_roots, so no process scenario could be
expressed on Windows at all. The report suggested node:path's isAbsolute, but
that answers for the host running the check: on Linux `C:\tools` is not
absolute, so a scenario captured on Windows would fail validation when it is
replayed, compared, or asserted in a test on another host. A boundary schema
must not vary with its evaluator, so the check accepts the POSIX form, a
Windows drive path and a UNC share everywhere. The rejection message now names
the constraint instead of leaving the caller to infer it from "invalid request".
The HTTP `path` field inside `checkpoints` is an URL path and is deliberately
left alone.
I checked whether this merely moved the failure downstream: containment is
enforced by isPathWithinRoot, which already uses host-aware path.relative, so
validation really was the only blocker.
#545: when a scope is inside the administrator ceiling but no grant was ever
issued, the denial still pointed at widening the ceiling -- advice that cannot
help, since the ceiling already permits the operation. The `missing` payload is
computed against candidate *grants*, so it describes what a grant must cover,
not a ceiling gap. `PermissionRemediation` gains a `grant` variant saying
exactly that, and PermissionAuthority selects it when the denial is not a
ceiling violation. An explicitly requested remediation is still honoured, and a
genuine ceiling violation still says "configure".
* refactor(config): take the environment as an input at every configuration read
Completes B-2. Every `parseConfig(process.env)` site now reads from an
injected environment, so configuration-driven behaviour is a function of an
argument rather than of the machine running it.
The twelve sites were not equivalent, and treating them as one number would
have hidden the difference:
- **src/application/ (3 sites) were genuine defects.** `runSessionStatus`
already injected its `logger` but hardcoded `process.env` for config, so the
MCP path's `dependencies.env` never reached it; `captureProcessScenarioFile`
and `runAnalysis` had the same problem. `runAnalysis` gained `environment` on
the options object it already had, which is where its other injected
dependencies live.
- **The CLI command layer (9 sites) is a documented boundary,** where
`process.env` is legitimate. Rather than 9 independent ambient reads, they
now share one seam: `createCli(environment)` passes it to the seven
registrars that need configuration, and the nested helpers (`electronContext`,
`runtimeContext`, `loadConfiguredAuthority`, `inspectJavaScriptReplay`) take
it explicitly.
Every new parameter defaults to `process.env`, so all existing call sites are
unchanged and production behaviour is identical. The point is that the ambient
read is now a documented default at a boundary rather than a hidden dependency
deep inside behaviour.
`process.env` now survives in `src/` only as those default parameters —
nothing reads it at the point of use.
* style(cli): apply prettier formatting to the runtime observation command
Expose one plan/execute replay contract through both CLI and MCP with exact source, input, runtime, sandbox, limit, and export commitments.
Run selected ESM and extracted CommonJS/Rspack factories in a disposable Linux x64 Bubblewrap namespace with a content-addressed Node ELF closure, architecture-checked seccomp, delegated systemd cgroup limits, bounded protocol capture, cancellation, and observable cleanup.
Preserve left and right observations as Evidence, derive differential comparisons without erasing unknowns, add optional separately authorized reproducers, and fail closed on stale plans or unavailable host boundaries.
Add source-owned parser, sanitizer, clipboard, denial, timeout, OOM, protocol-forgery, and cancellation coverage; a real Linux verifier and workflow; regenerated catalogs and TypeDoc; and updated the packaged REA analysis skill for the 83-tool inventory.
