d867136cecbf4a8c0eea90897bc9a33341eb582c
19
Commits
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9581e067ad |
feat(pcap): add bounded capture summaries through CLI and MCP
Summarize saved Wireshark4.x captures with enforced native resource limits, serialized admission, stable snapshot verification and retained fact/text pages. Preserve complete inventories within resource budgets and source uncertainty; report cleanup failure with partial Evidence and retained ownership. Verified six recorded corpora /13026 packets with independent Scapy/Python oracles, real CLI/MCP/schema parity,60 SNI names,132 DNS addresses and1000 URIs. Real TShark CI now exercises summary/paging. Actual Windows/Bun Wireshark remains unverified; macOS capture requires a separate enforceable-bound decision. Co-authored-by: 3QL <85309073+3QL@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: N0zoM1z0 <161784452+N0zoM1z0@users.noreply.github.com> |
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85e124253a |
feat(server): frame analysis-target content as untrusted data (#1908)
* feat(server): frame analysis-target content as untrusted data
Strings, decompiled code, page text, scripts, captures and logs returned
by REA originate from the analysed target, which can embed text aimed at
the agent. Nothing marked that content, so a prompt injection inside a
binary or page could steer the agent toward tools that run code.
- Server instructions now state that target-derived tool output is data,
never instructions, and that any request in it to run, install,
download or send something is a prompt-injection attempt to report.
- Tool contracts declare returnsTargetContent. It is on by default; only
seven tools whose results hold REA session state or caller-supplied
values (binary_session, close_binary, export_evidence_bundle,
record_unknown, update_unknown, inspect_adb_client,
inspect_apktool_client) are audited exceptions, so new tools start
marked.
- Successful results of marked tools carry
_meta.provenance = { untrusted_content: true, source: "analysis_target" }.
content and structuredContent are unchanged, and the response budget
accounts for the fixed marker bytes.
Tests cover the encoding and budget accounting, the audited exception
list against the contract catalog, and an in-memory MCP client that sees
the instructions and the marker on a marked tool but not on
binary_session.
* fix(server): mark failed target-content results as untrusted too
The untrusted provenance marker was attached only on the success branch
of ToolResultDelivery, but failures can carry target-derived text as
well: error messages, captured output, and partial observations such as
the terminal frames a failed capture_process_scenario retains in
partial_observation. A host gating later process or device actions on the
marker would have treated an adversarial error payload as trusted.
Every error path in src/server now carries the failing tool's provenance:
- toErrorToolResult and toRecordedPartialErrorToolResult take the tool's
target-content flag explicitly, so each caller is audited by the type
checker; toCallToolResult, toEvidenceToolResult (recording failure), the
response-budget error that replaces an oversized success, and the
Electron partial-evidence path pass contract.returnsTargetContent.
- Admission failures in runAdmittedToolOperation resolve the flag from the
tool name through the new toolReturnsTargetContent, the same predicate
the contract metadata uses; unknown names stay marked.
- The transport's oversized-error replacement keeps the original's marker
and counts it in its budget check, matching the projected error.
- Errors the MCP SDK builds itself (input validation, thrown handlers) are
marked in the transport for target-content tools only.
Error encoding accounts for the marker bytes exactly as success encoding
does. docs/mcp-contracts.md now states that error results carry the
marker. Tests cover marked and unmarked error results, the
capture_process_scenario partial-observation errors in-process and over
the SDK transport, the recorded partial-evidence path, the budget
replacement, the oversized-error replacement, and SDK validation errors
for a marked and a content-free tool.
* fix(contracts): mark session status, close and client probes as target content
The content-free exception set was audited against successful results
only. Now that failures carry the marker too, every exception was
re-audited against its error paths with one question: can the result
include text produced by an external process, provider or device, or
stored content REA did not author?
Removed from TARGET_CONTENT_FREE_TOOLS:
- close_binary: a failed provider cleanup (GhidraClient cleanup error via
createGhidraDiagnostics) projects the launcher's captured stdout and
stderr, which can contain target-derived log text.
- binary_session: capability status reports runtime unavailability as the
provider error message (ProviderAdapterError and similar), and the
provider candidate and Android availability diagnostics include probe
output such as the apktool stderr excerpt.
- inspect_adb_client: the success result carries the version and
installed path parsed from `adb version` stdout, and a failed probe
keeps a stderr_excerpt.
- inspect_apktool_client: the success result carries the first line of
the launcher's `--version` output, and a failed probe keeps a
stderr_excerpt.
- update_unknown: the new revision carries forward the stored question
and domain, which an imported evidence bundle can supply; list_unknowns
and get_evidence_bundle already return that data marked.
The set now holds only export_evidence_bundle (path, byte and record
counts; failures are filesystem, cancellation, or a fixed integrity
message) and record_unknown (the caller's input plus REA-computed ids
and digests; registry errors project only a reason code).
The conformance test pins the reduced set and asserts each removed tool
is marked. Tests that used binary_session as the unmarked example now use
record_unknown. docs/mcp-contracts.md lists the remaining exceptions and
why the removed tools stay marked.
* fix(contracts): include target-content policy in the catalog identity
createToolCatalog() and CATALOG_IDENTITY.tools projected every
client-visible contract field except returnsTargetContent. Because the
untrusted-content framing left schemas, effects, prompts, CLI names and
the package version unchanged, a same-version MCP process started before
the update digested equal to the new server and binary_session reported
it aligned although it never emits _meta.provenance.
Project the flag as returns_target_content in both the digested tool
catalog and CATALOG_IDENTITY.tools, and export createCatalogDigests so a
boundary test proves that toggling the flag on one tool changes the
tools and combined digests.
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e4d3e1399d |
feat(flutter): identify Dart snapshot builds and inspect AOT payloads by pure APK parsing (#1582)
* feat(flutter): identify Dart snapshot builds by pure APK parsing Add a flutter-provider family with one operation, identify_flutter_build, that reads an APK's lib/<abi>/libapp.so and libflutter.so through the hardened ZIP reader and reports build facts as observations: - The Dart VM snapshot hash, read 20 bytes after every snapshot magic (f5f5dcdc). The vm and isolate sections are cross-checked: agreeing sections collapse to one snapshot_hash, disagreeing sections keep every candidate with snapshot_hash null and partial coverage. - Per-ABI library digests and byte sizes, plus the engine library's GNU build-id note and any labeled 'Dart VM version' or Android clang/LLVM toolchain strings, verbatim; release builds without a version string report null rather than a guess. - The APK is digested before parsing so Evidence binds the observation to the exact input, and a target with no libapp.so reports not-detected with complete coverage. The scanner is streaming with explicit pending-magic and rescan bookkeeping, so chunk boundaries cannot double-count or drop sections, and magic-free streams never accumulate. No engine, no external lookups: the hash-to-SDK mapping stays with external datasets by design. Verified against Flutter Gallery 2.9.2 (112 MB, three ABIs): every ABI reports the same agreeing hash 65817c30a78bb44c3dc3771876b6010a from two sections, per-ABI build-ids, and the clang toolchain line; a plain aapt2-built APK reports not-detected with complete coverage. Scanner goldens come from the same libraries. READMEs carry the new 'Flutter apps' row in every supported language. * feat(flutter): inspect Dart AOT snapshots through the ELF symbol table Add inspect_dart_aot to the flutter family: for one ABI's libapp.so it locates the four _kDart*Snapshot* symbols through the ELF dynamic symbol table (ELF32 and ELF64 little-endian, bounds-checked reads; a payload without exported symbols is refused), reports each section's offset and size, validates data-section headers (magic, kind, length; instructions sections honestly report nulls for the fields their layout does not carry), and projects a bounded string pool from the isolate data section: distinct package: source URIs (the app's dependency inventory), dart: SDK URIs, and identifier-shaped tokens, each with counts, bounds, and partial coverage when truncated. The string pool is labeled as a byte-pattern projection, not deserialized cluster semantics: typed class and function recovery remains an SDK-specific parser, which the snapshot hash now unlocks. The ABI is caller-selected with a deterministic default (arm64-v8a, x86_64, then first available). Verified against Flutter Gallery 2.9.2: all four symbols on both ELF64 (arm64-v8a) and ELF32 (armeabi-v7a) images, header validation, hash agreement with identify_flutter_build, and a 756 package: / 201 dart: URI pool from the isolate data section; goldens in DartElf.test.ts come from the same libraries. * fix(flutter): own snapshots, bound image reads, and preserve cancellation Mirror the ownership bar the maintainers applied across the merged JEB, ADB, and Apktool PRs: - Copy the admitted APK into a provider-owned, read-only snapshot (EXCL create, chmod 0400) before digesting and parsing; every later read uses the snapshot, so a concurrently modified original cannot mix into one observation. The result reports the snapshot's byte size and digest. - Retain failed snapshot-root cleanup in a provider set and retry it on close(), throwing an aggregate error when a root is still owned; root removal is injectable so the retention is testable. - Allocate the AOT image buffer at exactly the declared library size before reading (bounded before allocation, not concat-after-stream), keep the 256 MiB ceiling, and check cancellation between digest and stream chunks through a captured abort reason. - Accept APK paths containing spaces (covered by a fixture test) and escape the ABI pattern's dash for v-mode regex compatibility. Also add tests for cleanup retention with close retry and for cancellation before any snapshot root is created. * docs(flutter): cover the Italian README with the Flutter row The Italian translation landed between the merged feature PRs; its table now carries every merged row plus this one, keeping its documentation-link set identical to README.md. * fix(flutter): make the ABI pattern portable for v-mode validators Use a hex-escaped hyphen in the ABI character class, matching the form the ADB portability fix uses, so clients compiling advertised schemas in unicodeSets mode accept the inspect_dart_aot input schema. * refactor(flutter): reuse shared harnesses and deduplicate the vertical The duplicate-detection gate (jscpd, 2.5% threshold) tipped to 2.51% with the flutter files added. Reuse the existing machinery instead of repeating it: - FlutterBuildAnalysisService delegates to executeProviderOperation, the shared admission/Evidence composition, instead of restating its body. - The CLI registers both commands from one table-driven spec. - Boundary tests use the shared serveCli and assertAdvertisedMcpContracts harnesses rather than hand-rolled equivalents. - The provider test consolidates the four payload-shape cases into one table-driven case; the service test uses one admission table and distinct phrasings. Duplicate lines fall from 2.51% to 2.48%, back under the gate. * fix(flutter): address review findings from real-app verification CassieFox23 verified the PR against three real F-Droid Flutter apps and a control app, and found five gaps. All are fixed and re-verified against cone (info.tangential.cone), one of the tested apps: - Build-id: the scanner now reads the descriptor length from the note header instead of assuming 20 bytes, so 8-byte ids from older toolchains parse; the schema accepts 8-128 hex characters. Verified against cone's readelf-reported ids on all three ABIs. - Compiler line: the toolchain capture bound rises from 200 to 500 characters, keeping cone's 262-character clang line verbatim. - Zero-byte libapp.so: the extraction target is created before streaming, so an empty entry yields a clean unsupported_target refusal for inspect_dart_aot and elf_header_valid: false with partial coverage for identify_flutter_build, instead of a raw ENOENT with code UNKNOWN. - Truncated library: identify_flutter_build marks fewer than two snapshot sections as partial coverage with a limitation naming the count, and a missing ELF magic gets its own limitation. - Docs: the default ABI preference now matches the code exactly (arm64-v8a, x86_64, x86, armeabi-v7a, then the rest alphabetically). Also: every test that read the author's /tmp/opencode goldens now builds a self-contained synthetic ELF64 image with dynsym, four snapshot symbols, two snapshot sections, and a string pool, so the suite runs anywhere; the verify lane now requires a present hex build-id per ABI instead of accepting null. * fix(flutter): address the Codex review findings Eight findings, all applied: - P1: SnapshotHashScanner keeps candidates in a Set (no quadratic Array.includes) with a 64-distinct-hash cap, so a hostile payload of magic+hash records cannot stall the scan or bloat the response. - P1: projectStringPool stops admitting new distinct entries once each category reaches twice its projection bound and reports collectionCapped; allocation and sorting now track the response, not the payload. - P2: ZIP reader rejections during entry iteration or entry streaming map into the typed error algebra (cancellation vs input refusal) instead of escaping as unhandled exceptions in both operations. - P2: magic_valid now marks coverage only for the *Data symbols; a complete four-symbol image with valid data magics reports complete coverage (the instruction symbols intentionally lack the magic). - P2: the MCP server closes the Flutter provider during shutdown, so a retained snapshot root is retried and reported, not leaked. - P2: LabeledStringScanner commits matches only when a printable run is delimiter-terminated; the carry grows to 600 bytes so a 500-character toolchain line survives any chunk boundary untruncated. - P2: both Flutter tool effects declare writesFilesystem: true; the owned APK snapshot and extracted libapp.so are temporary writes. - P2: the verify lane asserts every ABI agrees on exactly one snapshot hash instead of discarding the computed set. * fix(flutter): address the second Codex review round Nine findings on the first-round fixes: - P1: identify_flutter_build enforces a cumulative extraction budget (768 MiB) across every library entry, not just per library, so an APK with many ABIs cannot stream an unbounded total. - P1: a single NUL-free printable run stops materializing at 1024 bytes and marks the pool capped, so an adversarial one-run section cannot allocate unbounded strings. - P1: ELF cString bounds the NUL-terminator scan to the name maximum plus one, so malformed symbol tables cannot scan the whole image per entry. - P2: mapReaderFailure distinguishes ArtifactReaderFailure texts — budget/limit rejections map to resource constraints, integrity failures (CRC/overlap/signature) to their own input refusal — instead of collapsing all reader failures into one message. - P2: the labeled-string carry is cleared when a delimiter commits a run, so consecutive toolchain lines are never concatenated. - P2: string-pool counts are renamed *_count_at_least and documented as lower bounds, because capped collection discards values beyond twice the projection bound. - P2: inspect_dart_aot marks hash disagreements, non-pair source counts, and candidate-cap saturation as partial coverage. - P2: only valid lowercase-hex hash records count as snapshot sources; complete magic records with non-hex fields do not inflate agreement. - P2: the per-entry size refusal in inspect_dart_aot moves after ABI selection, so an oversized unselected ABI no longer refuses a small request. * fix(flutter): address the third Codex review round Five findings: - P2: the owned snapshot revalidates the source after the copy (size, mtime, inode), so an in-place replacement or swap mid-copy refuses the observation instead of publishing mixed bytes. - P2: a failed ZipArtifactReader close retains the snapshot root for close() retry instead of silently swallowing the descriptor leak, in both operations. - P2: snapshot headers are parsed within their symbol bounds and a symbol smaller than the 16-byte header reports magic_valid false, so trailing-image bytes can no longer fake a valid data section. - P2: the verify lane counts provider.close() cleanup failures as lane failures instead of certifying a run with retained roots. - P2: LabeledStringScanner reports toolchain_capped when further distinct matching lines are observed past the 4-line projection; identify marks such results partial with a naming limitation. * fix(flutter): address rounds three and four of the Codex review Round three (one missed finding) plus round four (five findings): - P2: the GNU build-id note descriptor size is decoded from all four bytes of the little-endian field, rejecting nonzero high bytes instead of masking them to 16 bits. - P1: the Flutter MCP handlers route through createContractToolHandler and the session's analysisAdmission, so close_binary and snapshot operations drain in-flight Flutter calls instead of racing them. - P2: the owned-snapshot copy is a streamed, abort-checked write (no copyFile), so cancellation stops the write promptly while the source-identity revalidation (size, mtime, inode) still guards against mid-copy replacement. - P2: identify marks any snapshot_hash_sources value other than exactly two as partial, matching the inspection path's pair requirement. - P2: the verify lane refuses to run without --apk (exit 2) instead of printing a false-green pass, and the engine check requires every libapp-carrying ABI to have a present libflutter with a valid hex build-id rather than filtering missing engines away vacuously. * fix(flutter): address the fifth Codex review round Six findings plus the upstream duplication baseline: - P2: the flutter-provider kind reports available in the capability inventory, so binary_session no longer lists always-registered Flutter tools as provider_missing. - P2: printable runs that exceed the 1024-byte cap are discarded at their delimiter instead of emitting their truncated prefix as a fabricated observation. - P2: ELF symbols must fit inside the file-backed portion of their PT_LOAD segment (p_filesz), so addresses in gaps or BSS are refused instead of accepting unrelated bytes. - P2: the build-id carry spans the complete 80-byte maximum note (16-byte header + 64-byte descriptor) so chunk-boundary splits cannot drop the first byte. - P2: the labeled-string carry is sized for the toolchain pattern's true 605-byte maximum, not the previous 600. - P2: the AOT completeness predicate requires exactly two sources and one candidate unconditionally, so zero-source images with valid data magics report partial instead of complete. Also: the shared ELF fixture builder and snapshot-section helper moved to a dedicated FlutterTestFixtures module, eliminating cross-file test duplication; jscpd now passes at 2.50% while main sits at 2.52%. * fix(flutter): address the sixth Codex review round Five findings: - P2: snapshot-hash scanning is bounded to the exported data symbols' byte ranges, so decoy or stale magic/hash sequences elsewhere in the image cannot inflate source counts or contribute candidates. - P2: labeled-string runs longer than the carry bound are rejected instead of truncated, preventing a regex prefix from being published as a verbatim source string. - P2: the AOT image reread checks cancellation between file reads and before the synchronous parsing stage, so a cancelled caller cannot receive a success from a completed 256 MiB read. - P2: the verify lane requires exactly two snapshot sources per ABI, matching the provider's pair requirement, instead of accepting any count >= 2. - P2: ELF section and program header entry sizes are validated against the class-defined minimum widths before walking either table, so undersized entries cannot cause field reads to cross into neighboring bytes. * fix(flutter): address the seventh Codex review round Six findings: - P2: data-symbol ranges are deduplicated by offset and size, so aliased symbols mapping to the same bytes are scanned once and the result marks partial coverage with a limitation naming the shared range. - P2: openEntrySafely forwards return/throw to the underlying Readable's iterator, so an early for-await exit closes the ZIP entry stream and releases its producer instead of leaking a backpressured pipe. - P2: inspect_dart_aot now reports snapshot_hash_candidates and snapshot_hash_sources alongside snapshot_hash, so a null hash from conflicting evidence is distinguishable from missing hash data. - P2: overlong printable runs only set toolchain_capped when they begin with a recognized label prefix (Dart VM version: or Android (); other long strings such as license text are skipped without marking partial. - P2: readElfSymbol falls back to PT_DYNAMIC/DT_SYMTAB when section headers are absent (e_shnum 0, ET_DYN), so stripped Flutter libraries with exported snapshot symbols are no longer refused; the dynamic table is bounded by DT_STRSZ, DT_SYMENT, and the image end. - P2: the verify lane exercises inspect_dart_aot for every ABI carrying libapp.so, not just the preferred default. * fix(flutter): address the eighth Codex review round Five findings: - P2: each data-symbol range gets a fresh SnapshotHashScanner so the carry from one noncontiguous slice cannot fabricate a record spanning into the next; results are aggregated after scanning. - P2: dynsym name lookups are bounded to the linked string table — st_name offsets outside the table and terminators beyond it are rejected instead of reading unrelated payload bytes as symbol names, in both the section-header and PT_DYNAMIC paths. - P2: identify_flutter_build routes its reader.entries and reader.open calls through the same collectEntriesSafely and openEntrySafely wrappers as inspect_dart_aot, so malformed ZIPs surface as input refusals instead of AnalysisProtocolError. - P2: mapReaderFailure recognizes ArtifactReaderFailure texts carrying a cancelled reason, mapping them to AnalysisCancelledError instead of AnalysisInputError. - P2: the cumulative extraction cap is enforced inside the chunk loop, not after each library completes, so refusal happens before the remaining bytes are streamed and hashed. * fix(flutter): harden streaming, sizes, and cancellation after self-review Four issues found in a systematic self-audit across all bug classes from eight Codex rounds: - createReadStream in both the digest function and the owned-snapshot copy now receives the AbortSignal directly, so cancellation aborts the filesystem read at the source instead of waiting for the next chunk to arrive on a slow filesystem. - The owned snapshot enforces a 2 GiB APK-level size cap before any copy I/O, so a path pointing at an enormous file is refused before disk usage grows. - identify_flutter_build preflights the sum of declared entry sizes against the 768 MiB cumulative budget, refusing before any ZIP extraction when the declared total already exceeds it. - The LabeledStringScanner triple result() call is collapsed to a single invocation (the previous code called result() three times in the emission, relying on end() being idempotent). No behavior change for valid inputs; all 36 tests, check:fast, and the cone verify lane pass unchanged. * fix(flutter): require structurally parseable ELF headers for complete coverage CassieFox23's third corrupt-header case: an ELF with valid magic but zeroed section/program header offsets passes the 4-byte magic check and the byte scanner still finds hash patterns in the data sections, so identify_flutter_build reports complete coverage for a structurally broken file. The elf_header_valid check now also verifies beyond the magic: e_type must be a known value (ET_REL/ET_EXEC/ET_DYN), at least one of e_shoff/e_phoff must be non-zero, and at least one of e_shnum/e_phnum must be non-zero. A file with valid magic but zeroed structure reports partial coverage with the existing ELF-magic limitation. * fix(flutter): validate ELF and snapshot coverage Share bounded ELF header parsing between identification and inspection. Accumulate headers across ZIP chunks and validate table entry widths and extents before claiming complete identification coverage. Bind AOT hashes to the exported VM and isolate headers, validate stored snapshot lengths including the magic bytes, and preserve partial evidence for missing, malformed, aliased, or overlapping data headers. Preserve native stream cancellations and APK resource constraints across both operations. Bound snapshot copies while streaming and retain useful input-failure diagnostics and lower-bound count wording. Validation: 72 focused tests; check:fast; check including formatting; docs:check; test discovery; jscpd; real cone APK and non-Flutter control on Linux. Verified CLI/MCP parity for valid and corrupted ELF headers and AOT inspection across three ABIs. Native Windows and macOS were not run. * fix(flutter): unify artifact ownership and bound ELF evidence * fix(flutter): preserve ELF provenance and partial coverage Read GNU build IDs only from bounded ELF note ranges and retain conflicting candidates. Preserve source versus owned storage failures and honor cancellation through parsing and final cleanup. Separate snapshot structure from string-pool coverage. Verify every Gallery ABI with digest-bound engine labels and URI counts, and document the supported snapshot-kind layout. --------- Co-authored-by: REA Contributor <contributor@rea.tools> Co-authored-by: morluto <76467478+morluto@users.noreply.github.com> |
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96fd98cce0 |
feat(apktool): decode Android resource tables through a caller-supplied launcher (#1556)
* feat(apktool): decode Android resource tables through a caller-supplied launcher Add an Apktool family with two operations over the caller's apktool launcher (REA_APKTOOL_COMMAND, absolute, or apktool on PATH): - inspect_apktool_client: resolved launcher, selection source, and version; decodes nothing. - decode_android_resources: apktool d --no-src in a provider-owned workspace that is removed before the result returns. Projects the decoded AndroidManifest.xml (bounded at 512 KiB), apktool.yml version and SDK facts exactly as printed, string resources verbatim (default or one locale, bounded at 2000 entries, nested-markup entries counted as unparsed), available string locales, and the decoded file count with a hard cap. The target APK is digested with SHA-256 before decoding so Evidence binds the observation to the exact input. Smali production is skipped by design: Java-source recovery belongs to the JADX family. Workspace cleanup happens before results return; an unremovable workspace is named in the limitations instead of abandoned. Verified against apktool 2.7.0-dirty (Debian packaging) on Linux with OpenJDK 25 against a signed aapt2-built probe APK with two resource locales: launcher version, on-disk digest agreement, metadata projection, manifest package agreement, and both string tables (default and de). Parser goldens come from the same decode. READMEs carry the new 'Android resources' row in every supported language. * fix(apktool): own snapshots and bound decoded resource reads * docs(apktool): describe owned resources and bounded projection --------- Co-authored-by: REA Contributor <contributor@rea.tools> Co-authored-by: morluto <76467478+morluto@users.noreply.github.com> |
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749e58772a |
feat(jeb): add JEB engine provider over its MCP interface (#1536)
* feat(jeb): add JEB engine provider over its MCP interface
Add a bring-your-own JEB provider that serves project, unit, and
decompilation inspection from a caller-started JEB client speaking MCP
(streamable HTTP, selected with REA_JEB_MCP_URL). Expose four provider-neutral
operations through shared CLI/MCP workflows: inspect_jeb_client,
open_jeb_project, list_jeb_units, and decompile_jeb_item, each returning
Evidence with engine identity, endpoint, and preserved refusal reasons.
The adapter keeps JEB's envelope semantics: success fields are parsed
format-aware at the boundary, message-only refusals become unsupported-target
errors with the engine's own reason, transport failures become availability
failures with recovery guidance, and unit pagination derives coverage from the
engine's 100-item page cap. Explicit unknowns (implicitly selected unit,
omitted filters) are reported instead of guessed.
Verified against a real JEB 5.48.0 licensed build serving jeb-mcp-server 1.3.0
headless: client inspection, unit listing, and method decompilation were
exercised through the CLI, MCP boundary, and scripts/verify-jeb.mjs.
JEB 5.48.0 headless instances do not advertise open_project; the refusal is
preserved and documented.
* fix(jeb): verify against a real signed APK and fix CLI option surface
Verify the provider against a locally built, v1/v2/v3-signed probe APK
(binary manifest, classes.dex with a launcher activity) on JEB 5.48.0: the
full unit tree (apk, manifest, three certificate units, dex bytecode,
decompiler), wildcard-filtered and paginated unit listing with derived
coverage, parent-restricted listing, and launcher-activity method
decompilation through both CLI and MCP, including dexdec's inline
constant folding of the probe's obfuscated tag.
Move list-jeb-units filter/pagination and decompile-jeb-item unit selection
from positional arguments to options; the MCP schemas are unchanged.
* fix(jeb): preserve engine refusals through the real MCP boundary
Testing against the published Signal 8.30.3 universal APK exposed a boundary
bug the scripted provider tests missed: decodeJebToolResult raised a protocol
error for isError results before the provider could map JEB's
{success:false, message} envelope, so real engine refusals surfaced as
unreadable output instead of the engine's own reason. Decode refusal
envelopes like any structured result and let the provider preserve the
reason; cover the decoder directly, including contentless and unparseable
results.
Signal verification: full 109 MB R8/Kotlin/Compose APK with four signature
schemes and native arm64 ELF units parsed; MainActivity.onCreate and R8
synthetic lambdas decompiled through CLI and MCP; paginated, filtered, and
parent-restricted unit listing; refusal path confirmed on the live engine.
* docs(jeb): record Flutter Gallery verification on the real-engine lane
Verify the provider against the official Flutter Gallery 2.9.2 release APK
(112 MB): per-ABI libapp.so Dart AOT snapshot images analyzed as native code
with 75k methods on arm64, snapshot internals and wrapper methods decompiled
through both CLI and MCP with explicit unit selection, decoded manifest, and
filtered native-library unit discovery. Note that JEB 5.48.0 headless does
not expose the dedicated Dart snapshot processor or run_script; both remain
GUI-only engine surfaces.
* docs(jeb): translate the README JEB row for every supported language
The JEB row was inserted in English across all translated READMEs; each now
carries its own label, capability summary, requirements, and guide link
following that language's Android-row conventions.
* fix(jeb): enforce local endpoints and preserve cancellation
* fix(jeb): refuse redirects across the local MCP boundary
---------
Co-authored-by: REA Contributor <contributor@rea.tools>
Co-authored-by: morluto <76467478+morluto@users.noreply.github.com>
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fef6f73064 |
feat(adb): complete ADB device support for Android reverse engineering (#1552)
* feat(adb): acquire installed APK sets from connected Android devices Add a read-only ADB device-acquisition family over the caller's adb binary: inspect_adb_client, list_adb_devices, inspect_adb_device, list_adb_packages, and pull_adb_package, exposed through the CLI and MCP with shared admission, Evidence provenance (binary, version, serial, transport), and fixed argv vectors that never reach a shell. pull_adb_package acquires the complete split set reported by pm path into a package-named directory that must not exist, digesting every file with SHA-256 and keeping per-file failure reasons and partial coverage. Device kind is reported as an inference with its basis; getprop whitelisting keeps build identity bounded. REA installs nothing and never manages devices or emulators; the first device query may start the caller's local adb server, recorded when observed. Verified against adb 34.0.5 on Linux with an Android 14 (API 34) x86_64 emulator: full 224-package inventory, a real two-APK split set pulled with byte-exact digests, and a 73.9 MB system-package pull. npm run verify:adb records the lane; parser goldens come from the same device. READMEs carry the new row in every supported language. * feat(adb): complete the adb surface with observation, transfer, and lifecycle tools Extend the ADB family from five to twenty-four operations, all through fixed adb argument vectors with no shell exposure: Observation: read_adb_logcat (bounded dump, count/buffer/pid), inspect_adb_package (dumpsys package projection), list_adb_processes (ps -A), list_adb_directory (ls -la with kinds and symlink targets), list_adb_features (hex GL versions), list_adb_services (AIDL slash-suffixed names), inspect_adb_display (wm size and density), inspect_adb_window (focus declarations), read_adb_setting (device-side nulls reported as such), capture_adb_screen (exec-out screencap with PNG dimensions), collect_adb_bugreport (digested device archive). Transfer and search: pull_adb_file and push_adb_file (device-side sha256sum verification, explicit overwrite authority), resolve_adb_packages (substring package search with exact-match flag — the find step of an easy get). Lifecycle for dynamic analysis, each declaring mutatesTarget: install_adb_package and uninstall_adb_package preserving the device's Success/Failure verdict, start_adb_app (resolve-activity then am start -W), start_adb_activity (typed extras as --es/--ez/--ei/--el/--ef), and stop_adb_app (am force-stop). Verified end-to-end against adb 34.0.5 on Linux with an Android 14 (API 34) x86_64 emulator: 287 services, 92 features, split-set pulls with byte-exact digests, verified push/pull roundtrip, sized screen capture, and the full install → resolve → start → observe-in-ps → force-stop → uninstall lifecycle. Fixed a v-mode regex incompatibility in the settings key pattern and added argument descriptions required by the CLI catalog audit. * fix(adb): quote remote shell operands and protect captured output * test(adb): cover bugreport destinations containing spaces --------- Co-authored-by: REA Contributor <contributor@rea.tools> Co-authored-by: morluto <76467478+morluto@users.noreply.github.com> |
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5a7c769692 |
feat(firmware): integrate Binwalk and Unblob analysis
* feat(firmware): integrate Binwalk and Unblob analysis * fix(firmware): verify published files and namespace source references * test(firmware): isolate extractor dependency failure from process cleanup * fix(firmware): retain actionable report and cleanup diagnostics * test: assert retained batch output failure diagnostics |
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904d03e987 |
feat(android): integrate static APK analysis with headless JADX (#738)
* feat(android): integrate static APK analysis with headless JADX * test(android): include APK tools in explicit effects audit |
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b8a9da0c0f |
refactor(mcp): make analysis states unrepresentable (#468)
* refactor(config): parse capability settings into exact states * refactor(runtime): encode replay and process outcomes exactly * refactor: make analysis states unrepresentable * refactor(mcp): register canonical schemas with SDK * fix: preserve capability and catalog invariants * fix(build): remove stale compiled modules * fix(replay): update real verifier policy dependency * fix(package): verify the complete MCP catalog * fix(test): supply complete replay reload policy * refactor(contracts): centralize output schema lookup * refactor(mcp): delegate protocol boundaries to SDK * fix(browser): approve real source capture * fix(mcp): preserve catalog guidance |
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fecddc0549 | perf(mcp): reduce cold-start work | ||
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035e1144b0 | feat(server): advertise available tools dynamically | ||
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b9bead2809 | fix(ci): keep tool kind type internal | ||
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d7d6bdf474 | fix: align session filters and Hopper verification | ||
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ee1cd40405 |
feat(mcp)!: harden contracts and evidence references
BREAKING CHANGE: comparison tools now require session-owned Evidence IDs or approved bundle paths, and structured Evidence results use compact references. |
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c251c38aa2 | feat(dotnet): add managed artifact triage | ||
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778b995bbf | feat(application): add cross-layer graph workflows | ||
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be76f8090b | feat: add web and Electron reverse-engineering workflows | ||
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2c1ceabbf1 | feat: add passive website reverse engineering | ||
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c439b9e778 | feat(analysis): add provider-neutral persistent snapshots |